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Abstract Why is Turkey’s approach to EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) more cautious now after a
period of active cooperation in their shared neighbourhood? How can such reversal
be explained despite parallels in the interests of the EU and Turkey in their shared
neighbourhood and complementarities in their policy instruments used to advance
these interests? This article evaluates the explanatory power of rational choice,
sociological and historical institutionalism in comparative politics in addressing
these questions. On the basis of qualitative case study evidence including interviews
with key stakeholders, it concludes that historical institutionalism, with its emphasis
on context, interaction and temporality, is better equipped than rational choice
and sociological institutionalisms at accounting for Turkey’s changing foreign
policy choices concerning the ENP and the UfM.
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Introduction
Despite a consensus on the mantra that ‘institutions matter’, there has been
a battle royale in comparative politics concerning epistemology and ontology
among institutionalisms. Recently scholars plead for a truce suggesting that we
should enquire ‘how they complement one another, where they contradict one
another, and what they contribute to our knowledge of political social reality’
(Schmidt, 2010, p. 48). This study addresses the puzzle as to why Turkish
foreign policymakers’ approach the European Union’s (EU) two external
relations instruments – the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the
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Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) – addressing their shared neighbourhood
rather cautiously in the current period after Turkey had been actively pursuing
an agenda of cooperation with the EU on this front until 2007. Such policy
choice is puzzling because foreign policy interests of Turkey and the EU in
the region in the 2000s continue to run in parallel with complementarities in
policy instruments. Then why did Turkey change course with respect to her
approach to EU’s new instruments even after a period of active cooperation?
This article aims to evaluate the relative explanatory powers of rational
choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutional-
ism (henceforth RCI, SI and HI, respectively) through a case study of Turkey’s
changing approach to the ENP and the UfM. It adopts the ‘zero-order
competitive’ research design proposed by Jupille et al (2003) whereby each theory
is evaluated ‘against a null model of random effects without controlling for the
variables in the other theory’ in order to learn ‘something about the scope y of
each theory’s predictions, where the overlap occurs, and thus where they are
observationally equivalent or distinct’. It does so as this design has the greatest
potential for advancing competitive dialogue in cases where the explanatory
factors employed by each theory are largely uncorrelated (Jupille et al, 2003,
pp. 25–29). Since each variant of institutionalism has its own set of priors,
conceptions of institutions and actors, and explanatory principles, the ‘zero-order
competitive’ research design is the most suitable for a ‘discriminating test’ of these
variants. Therefore this study aims to start a debate by making extrapolations
from three competing institutionalisms for the case at hand. Through a com-
petitive test, it shows that RCI and SI fail to predict Turkey’s changing approach
towards these policies and concludes that it can best be accounted for by HI
relying on historically oriented methods. It demonstrates how the interaction
between institutions representing stability and not-so-stagnant contexts in real
time explains outcomes as much as institutions per se. At the same time, this is
a case where temporality, another HI insight, plays a central role. We cast our
arguments, however, without prejudging the fact that other variants of insti-
tutionalism may be better equipped for entertaining certain types of substantive
research questions than others.
This study addresses the puzzle why Turkey’s approach to the ENP and the
UfM changed from supportive to cautious in 2007 after President Sarkozy’s
invitation to Turkey to join the ‘Mediterranean Union’ (MU) (subsequently
renamed UfM) instead of membership to the EU. It reveals that in the first
period (1999–2007), policymakers, operating within the parameters of the
institution of Westernization, linked their supportive stance for the UfM to
serving the goal of full membership to the EU given the positive context. In the
second period, however, informed by the same institution, they have opted
for a reserved attitude as the new negative context meant that behaving
otherwise would only impair Turkey’s full membership prospects. Thus the
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main argument of this study is that context, interaction and temporality – best
captured by HI – structures Turkey’s shifting approach to the ENP and the
UfM.
Designed as a case study, this article relies on qualitative case study methods.
In addition to using historical methods, it relies on empirical evidence based
on 85 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders (leading figures from
major political parties, business associations, labour unions, civil society
groups, bureaucracy, and key experts in research institutions and observers in
the media) on their approach (from 1999 to the current period) to Turkey–EU
relations conducted in 2008.1
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The second section
reviews the rationale, objectives and content of the EU’s new external relations
instruments, which aim to instigate domestic change in the EU’s neighbour-
hood without promising accession. The third section summarizes the western
orientation of Turkish foreign policy and shows that there exist parallels
in foreign policy interests and complementarities in policy tools of Turkey
and the EU in their shared neighbourhood. The fourth section shows that the
expectations of RCI and SI in the direction that Turkey would act in parallel
with the ENP and the UfM are not borne by the historical record. The fifth
section examines the case through the lens of HI by demonstrating how context
and temporality together with institutions determine outcomes. The last section
concludes by specifying caveats to our conclusions.
EU’s New Instruments of External Relations: Europeanization without
Accession
The EU launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995 to
introduce social, economic and political change in the Mediterranean followed
by the European Security Strategy and the ENP, which aimed at remedying
the weaknesses of the EMP in the wake of the fifth enlargement. Increasing
emphasis on eastern partners in the ENP was counterbalanced with the
re-launching of the EMP under the Barcelona Process: UfM in 2008. These
new instruments of external relations were devised to maintain the EU’s
claim for regional influence without over-expanding the capability-expectation
gap in external relations. They aim at instigating domestic change (read,
Europeanization writ large) in the EU’s neighbourhood without the usual
carrot of membership. Despite the challenges they are facing, these policies
have found their way into the Lisbon Treaty (Article 1 paragraph 10). In this
section, we review the rationale, objectives and content of these policies so as
to demonstrate in the following section the parallels between these and those
of Turkish foreign policy.
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The ENP was launched with the Commission’s communication on ‘Wider
Europe’ followed up by a ‘Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood
Policy’ in 2004. The policy addresses countries of the Mediterranean and the
eastern neighbours of the enlarged EU. Its overall objective is to reinforce
‘prosperity, stability and security in the neighbourhood’ by offering neighbours
‘a privileged relationship, building upon mutual commitment to common
values’ of democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance,
market economy and sustainable development. It aims to facilitate reform to
remedy common challenges on ‘prosperity gaps, migration, crime, environ-
mental issues, public health, extremism and terrorism’.2 The ENP is ‘member-
ship neutral’ as it forecloses the option of accession aiming at engendering
Europeanization without accession – a framework that is more than cooperation
but less than membership.
The UfM evolved into an EU foreign policy tool after MU, its initial
incarnation, faced mixed reactions from member states. It involves the 27 EU
members and 16 partners in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle
East. It emphasizes governance, visibility and implementation of projects with
a set of priorities addressing environment, transportation, education and business
in the Mediterranean. It also aims at providing a platform for bringing together
Israel, Palestine and Syria for resolving conflicts in the region. This instrument,
too, envisions Europeanization in the Mediterranean without EU accession
through establishing ‘special relationships’. Although the Paris Summit con-
cluded that the UfM ‘will be independent from the EU enlargement policy,
accession negotiations and the pre-accession process’,3 many observers claimed
that it was invented to preclude membership to Turkey (Emerson and Tocci,
2007; Balfour and Schmidt, 2008).
Turkish Foreign Policy: Westernization, the ENP and the UfM
This section shows that, first, the main institution shaping Turkey’s foreign
policy choices remains Westernization anchoring Turkey to the West through
full membership to the EU. Second, it demonstrates that foreign policies of
Turkey and the EU were increasingly compatible until about 2007 due to their
shared interests and policy instruments in their shared neighbourhood.
For more than half a century, Turkish foreign policymakers saw EU
membership in its ‘broader civilizational context, bringing Turkey closer to
Western civilization in line with the republican ideals of modernization
and Westernization’ (Eralp, 2009, p. 152) with foreign policies anchored in
‘Western orientation’ (Bilgin, 2009). The ruling political elite – left, right and
centre – have come to view EU membership as a vehicle ‘for becoming part
of the European civilization which Ataturk espoused’,4 a ‘concrete expression
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of the project of modernization Ataturk introduced’,5 ‘a civilization project,
a peace project, a project of justice’,6 ‘the grandest project of our foreign
policy’7 and ‘a project our state is committed to’.8 Thus EU membership
‘features prominently in the official and embedded “state policy” that hardly
any government may dare change’ (Esen and Bolukbasi, 2008, p. 177). Such
strong views on Westernization-cum-full EU membership mean not only that
policymakers categorically rule out any alternative to full membership, but
also that it has come to constitute an ‘institution’, that is ‘sets of regularized
practices with a rule-like quality’ (Hall and Thelen, 2009, p. 9), in Turkey’s
foreign relations.
In line with ‘regularized practices’ of Westernization, Turkey’s foreign policy
interests in her neighbourhood and the instruments used to advance those
interests have increasingly become parallel to those of the EU especially since
the early 2000s. While keeping its western orientation there were signs that
the geographical focus of Turkish foreign policy was beginning to expand
already in the early 1980s when Turkey began to interact more intensively with
her neighbourhood. Since then Turkey’s relations with her neighbours had
been influenced by the maxim of ‘zero problems with neighbours’. In the 2000s,
Turkey’s focus on the neighbourhood was accentuated by a new policy idea –
‘strategic depth’ (Davutoglu, 2001) – through which Turkey’s foreign policy
became more proactive towards her neighbourhood.
In terms of Turkey’s changing foreign policy interests in her neighbourhood,
such renewed focus on Turkey’s (mostly southern and eastern) neighbours was
so frequently underscored that many claimed, either with anxiety or exultation,
that Turkish foreign policy was in a process of re-orientation. Many saw this
as a ‘tilting’ of Turkey’s ‘foreign policy axis’ towards the Middle East at the
expense of its Westernization bias. Most of the politicians, policymakers and
experts interviewed, however, affirm the continuity in Westernization as an
ordering principle of Turkish foreign policy. As former President Demirel
summarizes, Turkey’s foreign policy interests in her neighbourhood lie in
‘establishing a circle of stability and prosperity around Turkey’ where
‘democracy, pluralism, rule of law, and market economy would prevail’.9
Referring to parallels in Turkish and EU foreign policy interests, President Gul
emphasizes that ‘peace and stability’ in the region were the ‘common concerns’
of Turkey and the EU and that based on ‘common interests’, Turkey, ‘as a
candidate country at a very special geographic location will constitute an asset
in the implementation of the EU’s neighbourhood policy.’10 Referring to
Turkey’s neighbourhood, a high ranking diplomat adds that Turkey ‘in
common with the EU, pursues the goals of stability, security and, of course,
prosperity in this region’.11 Turkey’s official position presented in the detailed
screening process in 2006 resonated these views: Turkey ‘is determined to
contribute actively to the promotion of democracy, stability, prosperity and
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security in this region and beyond’ and ‘sees the ENP as an element of stability
and prosperity’.12 As they both aimed at becoming ‘soft power’ in their neigh-
bourhood (Benli Altunisik, 2008 for Turkey and Sjursen, 2006 for the EU),
Turkey’s approach to the ENP and the EMP had remained rather supportive
in the post-Helsinki period. Such support was also manifest in the increasing
alignment with CFSP declarations as reflected in the regular Progress Reports
only until 2007 after when alignment declines.
In terms of the policy instruments, Turkey had been increasingly relying on
a toolkit that is complementary to those used within the context of the ENP
and the UfM until 2007. In fact, Turkey’s official position towards EU’s
new instruments had been until then that she ‘appreciates the ENP as a tool’
(ibid.). Similar to the EU’s toolkit, Turkey relied on instruments therein
promoting domestic political and economic reform: first, with a view to
enhancing prosperity in the region Turkey had been promoting goods market
integration with her neighbours, which is reflected in almost a seven-fold
increase in the volume of trade with these partners between 1995 and 2007
(Kirisci, 2009). Second, as part of her efforts at increasing stability and security
in the neighbourhood, Turkey facilitated resolution of regional conflicts in the
Middle East by encouraging Syrian-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian dialogue.
Turkey also pursued a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council, and
upon election, President Gul stated that ‘Turkey will continue assuming an
influential role in the resolution of the problems to restore peace, stability
and tranquility in our region’ (Hurriyet Daily News, 18 November 2008). In
addition, Turkey plays a leading role in international institutions addressing
her neighbourhood such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the
Organization for Islamic Conference. Turkey has also been taking steps
towards rapprochement with Armenia and resolving the Cyprus issue.
Moreover, Turkey extends democratic assistance through TIKA (Turkish
Cooperation and Development Agency) to countries in her neighbourhood. It
is in this context that Turkey’s proactive engagement with her neighbourhood
in parallel to EU’s engagement with this region may be interpreted as a
strategic move aimed at advancing Turkey’s goals of full membership in the
EU through pursuing goals and using instruments complementary to those of
the EU.
Owing to reasons discussed below, however, there was a reversal of thinking
among policymakers from 2007 onwards. Foreign policy actors started to view
the ENP and the UfM as initiatives potentially relegating Turkey to the ranks
of ‘less than membership’. The tipping point in 2007 was Sarkozy’s proposal
that Turkey should become a member of the MU as he did ‘not believe that
Turkey belongs in Europe’ and wished instead ‘to offer Turkey y a true
partnership with Europe, it is not integration with Europe’ (Agence France
Press, 20 September 2007).
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Variants of Institutionalisms and Turkey’s Approach to the ENP
and the UfM
Three institutionalist approaches, RCI, SI and HI, crystallized around the
mid-1990s (Hall and Taylor, 1996). While these approaches agree on the view
that institutions matter, they differ with respect to their priors, views on the
nature of institutions and actors, and explanatory principles. This section
extrapolates the RCI and SI arguments to the case of Turkey’s approach to the
ENP and the UfM.13 As there exists no application of RCI or SI to the case
under study, it largely reconstructs how these would approach the research
question and make ex ante predictions accordingly. It shows that while
emphasizing different logics of action, RCI and SI would arrive at similar
conclusions that Turkey would emphatically support the ENP and the UfM.
RCI and Turkey’s approach to the ENP and the UfM
RCI focuses on how rational actors, pursuing their interests based on exo-
genously determined preferences within incentive structures (read, institutions),
follow a ‘logic of instrumentality’ or ‘logic of calculation’. RCI scholars would
begin with the axiom that actors rationally pursue their self-interests and derive
a testable hypothesis that can then be used to help explain and/or predict specific
outcomes. Strategic interaction would take place under institutional constraints
defining the incentive structure within which actors operate. Any foreign policy
decision, therefore, would be explained by ‘calculating’ the costs and benefits
of expected outcomes within a decision-making context constraining foreign
policy behaviour. As policy preferences and interests are exogenously given, RCI
would study the incentive structure foreign policymakers find themselves in.
Given Turkey’s revealed preferences for membership to the EU, policymakers
would have to solve the equation of how to maximize foreign policy interests
conditional upon the incentive structure of Westernization. Such maximization
process would involve a calculation whereby expected gains from partnership
with the ENP and the UfM would be measured against the expected costs
associated with that decision.
Neo-liberalism and neo-realism, which rely on the premises of RCI, would
expect Turkey to cooperate with the EU should expected gains of doing so
exceed potential costs. For neo-realists, states engage in alliances only to
ameliorate their individual positions by counterbalancing threats from other
states. Therefore Turkey would own the ENP and the UfM if doing so would
serve maximizing power and/or security. For neo-liberals, Turkey would
participate in cooperative schemes as doing so would bring, for example,
economic gains as a result of trade liberalization and (regional) integration in
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a world of complex interdependence. Hence Turkey would see these policies
as institutional solutions for reaping the benefits of expanding markets in the
region without having to bear unilaterally the political costs of market making.
Among the imputed opportunity costs of non-alignment with the ENP and
the UfM, first, Turkey would need to bear the social, economic and political
costs of pursuing her objectives in the neighbourhood as a single actor. Acting
as a model for liberal democracy promoting peace, stability and prosperity by
acting as donor and investor may result in overburdening Turkey. Second,
Turkey would forego a larger policy package involving a more diverse set of
instruments otherwise unavailable. Third, Turkey would have passed a critical
opportunity to act with the EU on an important foreign policy initiative, which
covers a region where she also has interests. Hence the balance sheet of the
potential gains and opportunity costs points to acting in parallel with the ENP
and the UfM, which contradicts the current state of affairs after 2007.
SI and Turkey’s approach to the ENP and the UfM
SI sees institutions as ‘socially constituted’ and ‘culturally framed’ with agents
acting according to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ and ‘senses of identity’ empha-
sizing ‘rule-governed action’ that follows from culturally-specific norms
(March and Olsen, 1998). Norms, according to SI, ‘constitute the identity of
the actors: they do not constrain their behaviour, but also constitute their
worldview and preferences’ (Sjursen, 2002, p. 492). SI would expect that
Turkey’s approach to the ENP and the UfM would be determined by the
legitimacy and appropriateness of Turkey’s decisions as a ‘good citizen’ of the
international community rather than by any utilitarian conception of self-
interest. SI would view Westernization-cum-full membership as an institution
that would constitute a normative and cognitive framework shaping Turkey’s
identity and interests through socialization and internalization. Normatively,
‘socialization’ would ensure that the values and norms representing the ENP
and the UfM (liberal democracy, prosperity, stability) would be ‘internalized’
by Turkey. Therefore Turkish foreign policymakers would behave according
to their ‘ethical-political’ sense of duty and obligation as structured by the
relationship between Turkey and the EU, which would be defined on the basis
of Westernization (Sjursen, 2002, p. 502). Cognitively, Westernization-cum-full
membership would provide a ‘cognitive script’ or ‘model’ (informing foreign
policy ideas of ‘zero problems with neighbours’ and ‘strategic depth’) deter-
mining Turkey’s foreign policy direction. Turkey would conform to the ENP
and the UfM as they would constitute institutionally prescribed behaviour
because they correspond to a ‘routine’ in Turkish foreign policy. Accordingly
Turkey’s approach to the ENP and the UfM would be studied as a case of
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how an institution ‘constructs or constitutes what states want or y what they
are’ (Finnemore, 1996, p. 338).
Given these two mechanisms, SI would predict that, first, ‘when preferences
are sufficiently homogenous’ such as in the case of Turkey’s foreign policy
goals and those of the EU as reflected in the ENP and the UfM, it would be
‘in one’s self interest to get along rather than be seen as a deviant’ (Rhodes
et al, 2008, p. xvi). Given the parallels in policy preferences in their shared
neighbourhood, Turkey would conform to the institutionally stipulated action
of cooperation which is ‘culturally necessary and “appropriate” ’ (Finnemore,
1996, p. 338). Second, as the Westernization process would be institutionalized
even further through the accession process, Turkey would be morally com-
mitted to the acquis (Chapter 31 under ‘political cooperation’) in conformity
with her newly acquired norm-based identity. Moreover, as SI sees foreign
policy as being about ‘defining rather than defending national interests’
(Finnemore, 1998, p. ix), scholars would explore how interests are constructed
through a process of social interaction. Policymakers interact with their
environment whereby shared norms, experiences and discourses help define
mutual interests. In this environment, states are seen as ‘a community of rule
followers and role players’ whose identities ‘are molded by social interaction
and experience’ (March and Olsen, 1998, p. 952). Therefore SI would expect
Turkey to act in parallel with the ENP and the UfM even after 2007 because it
would expect continuity in cooperative behaviour.
HI: Turkey’s Approach to the ENP and the UfM
The foregoing discussion suggests that RCI and SI would yield predictions
that contradict the empirical record since 2007. This section traces the
historical process through the lens of HI, which directs our attention to the
interplay of institutions and contexts determining temporally specific out-
comes. It demonstrates that the case at hand, which involves historical
processes and strong contextual effects, is best handled by HI (Pierson and
Skocpol, 2002; Steinmo, 2008).
Context and interaction
A major distinguishing feature of HI is that it ‘analyze[s] macro contexts
and hypothesize[s] about the combined effects of institutions and processes
rather than examining just one institution or process at a time’ (Pierson and
Skocpol, 2002, p. 696). In order to build credible causal explanations, scholars
in HI tradition invite us to be ‘attentive to the interaction between causal
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mechanisms and the context in which they operate’ (Faletti and Lynch, 2009,
p. 1144). They draw our attention to the interplay of institutions operating in,
and shaped by, overarching contexts by explicitly specifying the places and
dates that they focus on. They spell out clearly the mechanisms of interaction
between institutions and the contexts they are embedded in. They pay parti-
cular attention to the ‘scope conditions’ in a given empirical terrain showing
how it is the interaction between the mechanisms and the context that deter-
mines outcomes. It is thus their sensitivity to conditional variables that affords
HI its comparative advantage in showing how the impact of institutions is
heavily mediated by the context they are embedded in.
In determining what aspects of a particular context would be relevant to the
outcome scholars’ research strategy relies on tracing the historical process. We
observe that while EU–Turkey relations have always been characterized by
ebbs and flows, an ‘exogenous shock’ around 2007 soured the relations by
redefining the context within which Turkish foreign policymakers make their
choices regarding the ENP and the UfM. This ‘tipping point’ was Sarkozy’s
proposal for the MU/UfM. By offering membership in the UfM as a gambit,
Sarkozy was trying to shift Turkey from the ranks of a candidate for full
membership down to a member of a framework of regional cooperation – or so
was the perception of Turkish policymakers. The message, as put by Emerson
and Tocci (2007, p. 3), was taken as ‘Dear Turkey, I do not want you in
the European Union, but why not instead join us as a major player in the
Mediterranean Union’. It sounded as ‘the most credible’ version of the
otherwise implicit vows by Merkel and other European leaders who wanted
to deny Turkey full membership by offering instead a ‘special relationship’ or
‘privileged partnership’.14 By marking the beginning of a new context this
exogenous shock changed the background conditions (that is context) in
which the relationship between the institution of Westernization and Turkey’s
approach to the ENP and the UfM was reconfigured. Sarkozy’s proposal
played a central role in defining this new context (despite a reserved attitude
by the Commission) as Turkish policymakers still believed that ‘individual
EU countries continue to maintain high national profiles in the region than the
sum of countries that the EU purports to be’ (Ulgen, 2009, p. 21). This is an
example of how the starting point of a new context was marked by ‘decisions
made by political actors, often with proper names’ (Faletti and Lynch, 2009,
p. 1155). Such change in the contextual conditions represents an example
of ‘major historical disjunctures in noninstitutional background variables’,
which would ‘affect change in the dependent variable’ (Lieberman, 2001,
p. 1022).15
Such contextual change occurred against a background of institutional
continuity in the institution of Westernization-cum-full membership defining
mainstream politics.16 Thus the change in the outcome (Turkey’s caution
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towards the ENP and the UfM) was a result of an exogenous shock (Sarkozy’s
proposal) marking the end of one context and beginning of another. Hence
change in the outcome resides not in the relationship between Westernization
and Turkish foreign policy approach towards the ENP and the UfM, but in
the contextual variables that are extraneous to both the institution of
Westernization and the outcome: the implications of the ENP and the UfM
for Turkish foreign policymakers were different in the context of constructive
interaction (pre-2007) than that of the negative one (post-2007). Thus the
present study shows how ‘depending on the nature and attributes of y
contexts, the same causal mechanism could result in different outcomes’ as
conceived in the HI tradition (Faletti and Lynch, 2009, p. 1161).
Temporality
A second feature that distinguishes HI’s research strategies from those of other
institutionalisms is that scholars ‘take time seriously, specifying sequences and
tracing transformations and processes of varying scale and temporality’
(Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, pp. 695–696). While HI is ‘institutionalist’, it is the
qualifying adjective that differentiates these works from others across the
fence. History enters into the HI narratives through several ways.
Establishing causality
Timescapes are of crucial relevance to HI within which ‘causal mechanisms’ are
studied (Faletti and Lynch, 2009, p. 1145). Once an association is identified
between variables, theoretically grounded assertions of causal relationships
necessitate the specification of the temporal order of cause (input) and effect
(output) as they unfold over time. As applied to the case at hand, one reason why
researchers focus on the sequence of historical events is to identify the temporal
order of the input (Turkey’s long-established orientation of Westernization),
the output (Turkey’s approach to the ENP and the UfM) and the exogenous
variable that marks the beginning of a new context (Sarkozy’s UfM proposal
ruling out Turkish membership prospects). The temporal order of the input,
output and the contextual change is as follows: As an institutional feature of
Turkish foreign policy, Westernization precedes all other variables concerned and
remains stable throughout the period under study (1999 – present). Around 2007
the context within which Turkey’s foreign policy behaviour regarding the EU are
taken changes with Sarkozy offering Turkey a seat in the UfM instead of the EU.
It is only after this turning point, do we observe a change in Turkey’s behaviour
towards the ENP and the UfM.
These observations on the sequencing of the input, the contextual change and
the output, therefore, lead us to concur with Faletti and Lynch (2009, p. 1161)
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that ‘the causal mechanisms by themselves do not cause outcomes to occur;
rather, the interaction between causal mechanisms and context does’. This means
that the institution of Westernization-cum-full membership in the context pre-
ceding Sarkozy’s intervention (between 1999 and 2007) lead Turkish foreign
policymakers to support the EU’s initiatives in their shared neighbourhood.
However, the same institution leads to a cautious approach to the ENP and the
UfM after the exogenous shock changing the parameters within which foreign
policymakers make their decisions after 2007. In this way, analysing the
sequences of events helps us interpret the variation in the output (from support to
caution towards EU’s neighbourhood policies) as resulting from the interaction
of the institution (Westernization) and the context (which is characterized by a
change from one of supporting Turkey’s full membership to another of relegating
her to the ranks of less than full membership). Therefore, the sequence of events
shows that, it is the interaction of the institution of Westernization with the new
context that produced a different outcome than any other that would materialize
in an alternative context.
Path dependence
Agents in HI accounts follow a ‘logic of path dependence’ – ‘dynamics of self-
reinforcing or positive feedback processes in a political system’ that ‘reinforce
the recurrence of a particular pattern in the future’ (Pierson and Skocpol,
2002, p. 699). Once in motion, these feedback mechanisms create self-
reinforcing dynamics in the sense that once actors have followed a particular
path, it becomes difficult to reverse it as previously available alternative paths
become unavailable. Historical institutionalists study timing and sequence as
self-reinforcing processes precisely because these processes, by ‘playing out
over time in political and social life, transform the consequences of later
development’ creating irreversibilities (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p. 701).
As argued above, because Turkish foreign policymakers equate acting in
parallel with the ENP and the UfM as accepting an option less than full
membership in the present context, they would feel compelled to do otherwise
given the structuring impact of the institution of Westernization-cum-full
membership. In doing so, they follow a ‘logic of path dependence’ – once they
had followed an institutionalized path of Westernization-cum-full membership,
it becomes difficult to deviate from it when alternative paths emerge. In fact,
opting for these alternative paths might have seemed even more attractive
for policymakers as expected gains of doing so would have exceed potential
risks. Moreover, this scenario may have been more compatible with foreign
policymakers’ new policy ideas of ‘strategic depth’ adding to potential gains
even more. However, as the present case study demonstrates, although acting
together with the ENP and the UfM may jibe better with these new ideas, for
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policymakers, doing so in the current context would amount to a path
departure from the main orientation of Westernization. Unless the conditions
specified in the concluding section materialize, the current consensus among
stakeholders implies that the new ideas of ‘strategic depth’ (read, a de-emphasis
on Westernization) would not be strong enough to derail the institutionalized
trajectory of Turkish foreign policy towards full membership.
Path dependence works through two mechanisms: first, through a functional
mechanism where once Westernization-cum-full membership is in place,
‘actors adapt their strategies in ways that reflect but also reinforce the “logic”
of the system’ (Thelen, 1999, p. 392). The self-reinforcing positive feedback
mechanisms led all stakeholders categorically adapting their strategies towards
supporting EU membership after 1999. Politicians do so, for example, as their
support for EU membership not only appeals to masses and broadens electoral
base in domestic political competition but also helps establish credibility in
the eyes of foreign audiences (Esen and Bolukbasi, 2008). Second, through a
distributionary mechanism, institutions ‘reflect, y reproduce and magnify
particular patterns of power distribution in politics’ and their ‘policy feedbacks
actively facilitate the organization and empowerment of certain groups while
actively disarticulating and marginalizing others’ (Thelen, 1999, p. 394). Thus
as the EU has a ‘make-or-break effect’ on Turkish politics, the power of actors
who support EU membership are more likely to increase in political
competition. Moreover, even those who are known for their euro-sceptic
attitudes moderate their discourses on EU membership as their attitudes would
determine whether they would be considered mainstream or marginal. As a
result of these feedback mechanisms, preferences of actors were realigned so
as to constitute an unequivocal consensus on full membership and therefore
any other type of relationship between Turkey and the EU has been viewed
as a deviation from the full membership path. Since the ENP and the UfM, as
of 2007, represented a departure from this long-established path as such,
any approval by domestic actors of this option was foreclosed from the
beginning.17
Incremental changes and threshold effects
HI aims not only at establishing the specific timing of particular outcomes,
but also identifying the structural preconditions for these outcomes to occur.
Scholars analyse outcomes in a longer time frame because some processes may
occur only incrementally and/or be subject to threshold effects whose impact
may materialize only in the longer run. Thus, historical institutionalists study
long-term dynamics in order not to miss dimensions, which may seem
insignificant in the short term yet whose impact on a particular outcome may
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be visible only subsequently. Thus, as Pierson (2004, p. 2) argues we should
be ‘shifting from snapshots to moving pictures’, which means ‘systematically
situating particular moments (including the present) in a temporal sequence of
events and processes stretching over extended periods’, or in other words,
placing ‘politics in time’.
This study aimed at first identifying the specific timing of particular
outcomes by shedding empirical light on the incremental dynamics of the
more-than-half-a-century of relations between Turkey and the EU. The way
Turkish policymakers interpret the ENP and the UfM can only be explained
by inquiring into the incremental dynamics of the relationship between
Turkey and the EU. An analysis of the history of the relationship clearly
points to the fact that except for the 1960s during which the seeds of the
relationship had been sown and a brief period after 1999 when candidacy status
was offered to Turkey, the EC/EU had displayed an ambivalent attitude to
Turkey. After the launching of accession negotiations in 2005, the relations
had grown sourer as Turkey became an ‘easy target’ for misgivings in the wake
of and after the fifth enlargement (Eralp, 2009). In fact, given member state
governments’ ‘strong preferences against Turkish membership’, which ‘could
have stopped the process at every stage’, the decision to open accession nego-
tiations was ‘puzzling’ for many (Schimmelfennig, 2009, pp. 415 and 429).
While the average processing time for application for membership has gone
down to as short as 5 years as in the case of the fifth enlargement, the Turkish
saga of more than half a century of sitting in the waiting room exasperated
policymakers.18 Therefore the trajectory of the relationship between Turkey
and the EU incrementally accumulated a negative view, which compelled
stakeholders to treat initiatives concerning Turkey with caution.
Second, this study also aimed at identifying the structural preconditions for
the reconfiguration of the relationship between Westernization and Turkey’s
approach to the ENP and the UfM through analysing the outcome within
a longer time frame. When Sarkozy proposed Turkey membership in the
MU/UfM, such exogenous shock could have been read by Turkish foreign
policymakers as yet another hurdle in the long history between Turkey and
the EU. After all, some stakeholders reported in the interviews that they had
been accustomed to by now to ‘moving targets’ on this journey to the extent
that this is perceived as ‘business as usual’.19 However, reactions were different
this time. First, as it was heavyweight France that was tabling this proposal,
and second, as the initiative represented the ultimate concretization of
otherwise vague proposals of ‘special relationship’ or ‘privileged partnership’,
it was viewed by stakeholders as the last straw on the camel’s back.20 Such
shock that marked the beginning of a new context represented a ‘tipping point’
where ‘the cumulative cause finally passes a threshold and leads to a rapid
change in the outcome’ (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007, p. 351). It is passing
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through this threshold that led to a change in the context of EU–Turkey
relations whose interaction with the institution of Westernization resulted in
Turkey’s cautious approach to the ENP and the UfM. In a nutshell, therefore,
by tracing the incremental dynamics of the long-term relationship between
the EU and Turkey and identifying instances of threshold effects therein this
study points to the independent causal power of extraneous influences on
Turkey’s approach to the ENP and the UfM.
Conclusions and Caveats
This article addressed the puzzle as to why Turkish foreign policymakers
approach the ENP and the UfM rather cautiously from 2007 onwards despite
explicit parallels in the interests of the EU and Turkey in their shared neigh-
bourhood and complementarities in their policy instruments used to advance
these interests. After having shown that RCI and SI would expect scenarios
that are not borne by empirical evidence, it shows that Turkey’s approach
to the ENP and the UfM can best be explained by HI drawing attention to
four main issues. First, HI compels us to analyse the dynamic interaction of
the institution of Westernization with the changing context of EU–Turkey
relations. Second, it encourages us to search for the self-reinforcing positive
feedback mechanisms where the institution of Westernization-cum-full
membership caused path dependence even when more attractive alternatives
emerge. Third, it points to the significance of incremental processes, which
imparted on policymakers a sceptical view of EU’s moves influencing their
decisions. Fourth, it emphasizes that identifying tipping points with threshold
effects, such as Sarkozy’s proposal in 2007, is central to analysing long-term
historical processes. These insights from HI, therefore, explain Turkey’s
changing approach towards the ENP and the UfM by highlighting the fact that
Turkish policymakers would like to see themselves as a ‘host’ of the policies
addressing their neighbourhood they share with the EU (their perception
before 2007) as opposed to a ‘guest’ sitting on the other side of the fence (as
was the case after 2007).
On the basis of the evidence from this case study, we concur with all stripes
of institutionalists that institutions do matter in determining social and
political outcomes; they do so, however, only through their interaction with
the context and this is where we differ from those that overlook this point.
Outcomes will partly bear the imprints of institutions as long as they indeed
remain regularized as in the case of Westernization leading policymakers
follow their paths.
While scholars of HI would refrain from predicting outcomes (Steinmo,
2008), two caveats, the first one concerning external and the second domestic
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factors, are in order which may lead to path departure. First, this study
suggests that a potential change in the context towards a positive mood and
interaction between Turkey and the EU would highly likely result in Turkey
acting in parallel with the ENP and the UfM. Conversely, should the current
context of negative mood and interaction persist, Turkish policymakers may
permanently dissociate themselves from pursuing the objectives of the ENP
and the UfM together with the EU. The interaction of this new context with
the existing institution of Westernization may produce an even irremediable
strain on EU–Turkey relations.
Second, this study assumes that Turkey’s foreign policy would remain to be
firmly locked-in into the track to EU membership. In an alternative scenario,
rising to power of programmatic ideas such as ‘strategic depth’ may
incrementally cause path departure from the Westernization institution. Such
process may amount to what Streeck and Thelen (2005) refer to as institutional
change through ‘layering’. By setting in motion new dynamics, these ideas,
while not directly denting the existing institution of Westernization, may
‘actively crowd out or supplant by default the old system as the domain of the
latter progressively shrinks relative to that of the former’ (Streeck and Thelen,
2005, p. 24). Such process may transform Turkey’s current cautious approach
into a permanent disengagement from cooperating with the EU on the ENP
and the UfM, and Turkish foreign policymakers may pursue a key role in the
region entirely independent of the EU. Whichever of these scenarios unfolds
in the medium term, therefore, it will shape not only Turkey’s approach to
the policy instruments of the ENP and the UfM but also the future between
the EU and Turkey – a future afflicted by a strained history and an
unaccommodating context.
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Notes
1 General findings on stakeholder attitudes towards Turkey–EU relations were presented in Esen
and Bolukbasi (2008).
2 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/faq_en.htm (accessed 14 November 2009).
3 www.euractiv.com, 14 July 2008 (accessed 11 November 2009).
4 Interview with Onur Oymen, Deputy Chairman of the Republican People’s Party (RPP),
Member of Parliament (MP) and former Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June
2008.
5 Interview with Cemil Cicek, Deputy Prime Minister and former Minister of Justice, former
Minister of State, Justice and Development Party (JDP) MP, 29 May 2008.
6 Interview with Suleyman Demirel, Former President, former Prime Minister, and former True
Path Party MP, 10 July 2008.
7 Interview with Mevlut Cavusoglu, Chairman of the European Council Parliamentarians
Assembly, JDP’s Deputy Coordinator for Foreign Relations, 20 June 2008.
8 Interview with Sevket Bulent Yahnici, Former Deputy Chairman of the Nationalist Action
Party (NAP), former chief of cabinet of Devlet Bahceli, and former Nationalist Action Party
MP, 7 June 2008.
9 Interview with Suleyman Demirel (see endnote 6).
10 Interview with Abdullah Gul, President, Former Member of Parliament, former Prime
Minister, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and former JDP MP, 1 July 2008.
11 Interview with Zergun Koruturk, Deputy Undersecretary for European Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 27 June 2008.
12 Presentation by Turkey on the ‘Participation in CFSP/ESDP’, Chapter 31 Detailed Screening
Process, October 2006.
13 For earlier accounts from the EU’s perspective drawing on RCI and SI for explaining
enlargement in general, see Schimmelfennig (1999). For a similar account focusing on Turkey’s
accession, see Camyar (2009).
14 Interview with Oguz Oyan, Member of RPP Party Assembly, 28 May 2008. Other key
politicians who emphasize similar points include Onur Oymen (see endnote 4), Cemil Cicek (see
endnote 5), Suat Kiniklioglu, Speaker of Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Relations,
Deputy Chief of Foreign Relations of JDP, 5 June 2008; Mehmet Dulger, former Chairman of
Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Relations, former JDP MP, 6 June 2008; Yasar Yakis,
Chairman of Parliamentary Commission on EU Harmonization, Co-president of EU-Turkey
Joint Parliamentary Commission, former Foreign Minister, Deputy Chairman of JDP
Responsible for Foreign Relations, 23 May 2008.
15 Nota bene the difference in terminology in characterizing moments of change between those in
contextual variables (‘historical disjunctures in noninstitutional background variables’) and
others in institutions themselves (‘critical junctures’), which represent situations of ‘relatively
long periods of path-dependent institutional stability and reproduction that are punctuated
occasionally by brief phases of institutional flux’ (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007, p. 341).
16 Policymakers’ statements like ‘no one can dare to state that s/he is against the EU’ were
frequent in the interviews including those with Cemil Cicek (see endnote 5), Oguz Oyan (see
endnote 14), Onur Oymen (see endnote 4) and Sevket Bulent Yahnici (see endnote 8).
17 There is a united front against any proposal for less than full membership among the
stakeholders interviewed. For example, Cicek scorns: the EU is ‘deceiving Turkey with an
indecent proposal’ to use her as a ‘concubine rather than an official spouse’ (see endnote 5).
18 In fact, 73 out of 85 stakeholders interviewed refer to ‘double standards’ or ‘hypocrisy’ in
portraying the EU’s attitudes to Turkey.
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19 Interviews with Yasar Yakis (see endnote 14), Onur Oymen (see endnote 4), Oguz Oyan (see
endnote 14), Ali Bayramoglu, JDP MP and former Chairman of MUSIAD (The Association of
Independent Industrialists and Businessmen), 3 June 2008.
20 Moreover this proposal was made just after the EU had refused to open a chapter in June 2007
due to French opposition and before France demanded the exclusion of the term ‘accession’ in
the paragraph concerning Turkey from the Presidency Conclusions in December 2007. These
actions enraged even TUSIAD (The Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen), an
ardent supporter of Turkish accession. (Interview with Zafer Yenal, TUSIAD’s Secretary
General, 4 June 2008).
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